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Enabling roles of relationship governance mechanisms in the choice of inter-
firm conflict resolution strategies 
Purpose – This study presents an integrated framework and investigates the enabling roles of 
governance mechanisms (i.e., contract, interdependence, trust, communication) in the choice 
of effective conflict resolution strategies (CRS) that in turn facilitate buyer-supplier 
relationship (BSR) performance. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using web-survey, data are collected from 170 Finnish 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that have key relationships with suppliers. This study 
employs structural equational modelling to test the research framework and hypotheses of the 
study.
Findings – The results based on empirical evidence demonstrate how the firms’ choice of CRS 
depends on the governance mechanisms. The problem-solving approach is the most preferable 
choice, while the legalistic approach remains the last resort influenced by different governance 
mechanisms. Interdependence and trust between firms drive them to compromise while 
resolving inter-organizational conflicts. The selected strategies by firms may also either 
reinforce or deteriorate relationship performance. 
Practical implications – Supply chain managers should recognize the context in which these 
choices of CRS are made as it guides them to anticipate their partner’s behaviour as well as 
influences their strategy choice decisions when coping with conflicts. A trustworthy 
environment supports in providing a certain level of confidence while interdependency drives 
firms to compromise. The legalistic strategy can hurt the partner’s feelings and diminish 
relationship performance. 
Originality/value – Conflicts in BSR have become inevitable, but the existing literature is 
missing evidence on how companies use CRS to enhance relationship performance. Hence, 
this study differs from those of earlier conflict studies as it provides a more integrative 
perspective of buyer-supplier conflict resolution process. This study argues that relationship 
governance mechanisms can be connected to the choice of effective CRS when tensions arise. 
Moreover, by assessing the relationship between CRS and relationship performance, this study 
offers valuable insights to understand that effective strategies enable partners to mutually adapt 
constructive approaches that facilitate cooperative behaviour and accommodate both parties’ 
interests and needs.   
Keywords: conflict resolution strategy, buyer-supplier relationship, governance mechanisms, 
relationship performance, structural equation modelling
Article Classification: Research paper 
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1. Introduction
Successfully managing buyer-supplier relationships drives firms towards superior relationship 
performance and competitive advantage. The constant attention by academics and 
practitioners, therefore, is evidence of the importance of improving capabilities to respond in 
problem-solving (Michalski et al., 2018; Shahzad et al., 2018). However, conflict is still a 
common and inevitable aspect of inter-firm relationship (Leckie et al., 2017) as partners are 
uncertain of a cooperative behavior (Liu et al., 2009) and they have unmatched business 
interests striving to accomplish their own objectives (Lumineau and Henderson, 2012). The 
cost of inter-firm disruptions stresses firms to explore the reasons behind the expensive and 
time consuming problems (Fawcett et al., 2015), because these problems function as threats 
that could turn a stable relationship into a failure (e.g., Fernandez et al., 2014). Further, the 
opposing perspectives and goals incongruence, strategic misalignment, lack of trust, 
information hoarding and asymmetric interdependence drive firms to conflict and relationship 
deterioration (Ratajczak-Mrozek et al., 2019; Murfield et al., 2016; Fawcett et al., 2015). The 
potential negative impact of these inter-firm conflicts overshadows the aggregate effects of 
relationship behaviors (Ratajczak-Mrozek et al., 2019). Therefore, conflict realization and 
resolution through a choice of suitable approaches becomes central to developing effective 
inter-firm collaboration, and receives a great deal of research interest (e.g., Gounaris et al., 
2016; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012; Bai et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017). However, focal 
companies in a supply chain differ in their choices of conflict resolution approaches – e.g. how 
they deal with emerging disagreements with suppliers. 
Although there is considerable research on inter-organizational conflict and conflict resolution 
in the context of joint ventures (Le Nguyen et al.; 2016; Lu, 2006; Wang et al., 2005), the 
applicability in the choice of conflict resolution strategies from the buyer-supplier perspective 
remains an important yet unidentified issue (Ndubisi, 2011; Lacity and Willcocks, 2017). The 
extant literature has also suggested the pivotal role of relational factors in mitigating inter-firm 
conflict (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Ndubisi, 2011; Yang et al., 2017), with a premise that these 
factors drive appropriate approaches to conflict resolution. Trust and contractual governance 
emerge as significant factors in the literature specifying the conflict’s origin and elucidate 
different aspects of conflict management (Ndubisi, 2011; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012; Bai 
et al., 2016). Despite this considerable research base and insights, the choice of conflict 
resolution techniques influenced by transactional (contracts and interdependence) and 
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relational (trust and communication) governance factors remains under-examined in the 
business and industrial marketing literature (Yang et al., 2017). The extant literature 
significantly lacks evidence of such a variant relationship performance in effective strategies 
used in emerging disagreements (Le Nguyen et al., 2016). Thus, additional empirical 
assessments regarding the link between governance mechanisms, conflict resolution strategies, 
and relationship performance are needed to better understand the comprehensive picture of 
buyer-supplier conflict resolution process.
Therefore, this study seeks to address these gaps in the literature. The research approach in this 
study differs from those of earlier conflict studies as it provides a more integrative perspective 
on buyer-supplier conflict resolution process. It contributes to business and industrial 
marketing literature by determining how relationship governance factors influence the choice 
of conflict resolution strategies and the impact that these strategies have on relationship 
performance. To extend the discussion on the role of contractual governance and trust in 
managing conflicts (i.e., conflict mitigation, constructive/destructive conflicts), we argue that 
relationship governance mechanisms can be connected to the choice of effective conflict 
resolution strategies when tensions arise. Relational partners should recognize the context in 
which these choices are made (Lin and Germain, 1998), as it guides firms to anticipate their 
partner’s behavior as well as influences their strategy choice decisions when coping with 
conflicts (Lin and Wang, 2002). Furthermore, this study offers valuable insights to understand 
that effective strategies enable partners to mutually adapt constructive approaches that facilitate 
cooperative behavior and accommodate both parties’ interests and needs.  
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Conflicts and types of conflict resolution 
Buyer-supplier conflict represents the disagreement between both partners, and emerges from 
inconsistencies between actual and desired behaviors (Yang et al., 2017). Recently, few 
empirical studies have delved into the details and recognized the significance of such disputes 
and overall conflict management (e.g., Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali et al., 2016; Claro et 
al., 2018; Tidström, 2014). Inter-firm conflict drives confusions and operational interruptions, 
and creates unstable behaviors of distrust and misleading information in decision-making 
processes (Murfield et al., 2016). Earlier conflict studies have presented different perspectives 
of conflict, such as functional/constructive or dysfunctional/destructive conflict (Claro et al., 
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2018; Leckie et al., 2017) and task conflict (Lee et al., 2017) in explaining the differences 
between strategies and value expectations (Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali et al., 2016). 
The conflict management literature has identified several strategies for resolving inter-firm 
conflicts determined by assertiveness (i.e., degree of concern for own benefits) and 
cooperativeness (i.e., degree of concern for other’s benefits). These conflict resolution styles 
include competing or forcing, collaborating or problem-solving, compromising, avoiding, 
accommodating or obliging, confronting and ignoring, bargaining, and politicizing (Dant and 
Schul, 1992). Some scholars argued that the efficacy of these conflict resolution styles is 
determined by the ability with which a strategy is implemented in a specific situation (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2010). Prior empirical studies have endorsed a comprehensive set of conflict 
resolution approaches, including problem-solving, compromising, forcing and legalistic 
strategies being more explicit in their nature (e.g., Lin and Germain, 1998; Lu, 2006; Le 
Nguyen et al., 2016). Hence, we included problem-solving, compromising and legalistic 
strategies as the best fit for the analysis, while leaving the forcing strategy out because it mainly 
focuses on the international joint venture context where dominant ownership positions, power 
asymmetries and cultural distance prevail. 
Problem-solving is an attractive strategy that encourages mutual discussion, coherent and 
efficient management of inter-organizational business processes and a search for better 
solutions, enhancing mutual benefits while avoiding any operational blockade by exchanging 
information (Michalski et al., 2018; Gounaries et al., 2016). The compromising strategy refers 
to accommodating both partners on a “middle-ground”. The compromising strategy may not 
require considerable involvement from each partner. It may limit the possibilities of exploring 
the best available alternatives, but a common agreed solution may help partners to continue 
their relationship smoothly (Wang et al., 2005; Tidström, 2014). The legalistic strategy refers 
to dealing with a conflict by practicing written contracts and informal binding agreements, as 
it offers an institutional framework wherein partners reconsider their rights and responsibilities 
(Lumineau and Henderson, 2012; Le Nguyen et al., 2016). However, this approach may 
demonstrate high costs and a lengthy process, which may destroy a trusted environment in the 
long run (Fischer, 2013).            
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2.2 Transactional governance mechanisms and CRS
Transactional governance mechanisms (i.e., contract completeness and interdependence) are 
considered as formal institutional measures in managing partners’ behaviors while offering 
structural ways to avoid opportunism and inter-firm conflicts (Liu et al., 2009; Mirkovski et 
al., 2016; Shahzad et al., 2018; Shahzad et al., 2015). Detailed contractual clauses are 
considered to be tangible expressions of confidence and commitment that promote inter-
organizational harmonization and a problem-solving attitude by mutually acceptable 
alternatives and help to strengthen cooperative relational experience (Yang et al., 2017; 
Mirkovski et al., 2016). Similarly, Lumineau and Malhotra (2011) argued that contract 
completeness creates coordination driven perception among partners and facilitates valuable 
communication and information sharing. However, the legal support of a contract is a self-
explanatory way for a partner to sanction the counterpart in case of contract terms violation 
(Cannon et al., 2000) and inability to engage in mutual conflict resolution. As a wide-ranging 
tool, contract functions in controlling predicted and unpredicted future circumstances (Liu et 
al., 2009), thereby minimizing behavioral uncertainty by enforcing formal rules, terms and 
procedures. This notion also makes the compromising approach ineffective because of the 
leverage of penalizing the counterpart offered by legal clauses in a contract (Wang et al., 2005; 
White et al., 2007). Therefore, as previous research has emphasized the impact of contractual 
governance in minimizing buyer-supplier conflicts (Yang et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Bai et 
al., 2016; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012), this study extends earlier conceptualizations and 
examines the role of contract completeness on firms’ preference of CRS. Thus, this study 
hypothesizes the following: 
H1. Contract completeness between the buyer and supplier is positively related to the (a) 
problem-solving and (b) legalistic strategies and inversely related to (c) the compromising 
strategy.  
Interdependence explicates the equal idiosyncratic investments in physical and human assets 
(as non-legal sanctions) having less value for alternative uses (Wright and Lockett, 2003; 
Kumar et al., 1995; Khalid and Ali, 2017). This results in symmetric interdependence as both 
partners are equally dependent on each other based on the relationship-specific investment they 
have made (Kumar et al., 1995). In contrast, asymmetric interdependence creates threats of 
opportunism and inter-firm conflicts because of the forcible control of the partner with less 
dependence (Michalski et al., 2018). Therefore, the higher degree of equal interdependence 
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promotes mutual hostages, relational ties and knowledge sharing through binding firms to a 
specific exchange arrangement (Shahzad et al., 2015; Huikkola et al., 2013; Shahzad et al., 
2018). It also affects their choices of alternative strategies in dealing with conflicts (Sharma 
and Parida, 2018). As international marketing scholars argued that balanced control and equal 
ownership facilitate integration and coordination among partners (Lin and Wang, 2002), the 
interdependence of inter-organizational exchange motivates partners to drive combined actions 
of joint problem-solving (Liu et al., 2009). Similarly, as idiosyncratic relational investments 
foster inter-firm joint learning (Huikkola et al., 2013) as well as higher stakes and commitment 
in relationships (Burkert et al., 2012; Le Nguyen et al., 2016), they may also guide firms to 
develop circumstantial understanding to compromise. However, because of their equal stakes 
in a relationship, partners might also seek legalistic remedies for reliability concerns as well 
when a “middle-ground” approach is not successful. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H2. The interdependence of the buyer and supplier is positively related to the (a) problem-
solving, (b) compromising and (c) legalistic strategies.   
2.3 Relational governance mechanisms and CRS
Relational factors (trust and communication) are important socially embedded factors in 
managing inter-organizational operational hazards (Shahzad et al., 2018; Wood, 2019; Shahzad 
et al., 2015; Luokkanen-Rabetino et al., 2017). Trust is defined as a confidence in one’s 
expectations about another’s behavior and partner’s goodwill, reliability and integrity (e.g., 
Dyer and Chu, 2011; Zaheer et al., 1998; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). A higher level of mutual 
trust results in quick negotiations by hindering asymmetrical power because of partners’ 
readiness (Fawcett et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2017). Thus, trust functions as an efficient 
facilitator in greater adaptability and enhances firms’ behavioral consistency (Yang et al., 2017; 
Fischer, 2013; Wood, 2019), thereby influencing their choice of more collaborative strategies 
in a disagreement (Gounaries et al., 2016). It is linked with an integrating, accommodating and 
compromising style of conflict handling as partners are encouraged to learn jointly and express 
feelings and concerns about their counterpart (Yang et al., 2017; Ndubisi, 2011). Furthermore, 
a trustful environment facilitates a fair and optimal solution (Yang et al., 2017), looks for a 
“middle-ground” and arrives at acceptable compromises (Ndubisi, 2011). In contrast, recent 
seminal research has found that a higher level of inter-partner trust encourages cooperative 
behavior while avoiding a legalistic approach in a conflict situation (Kozan et al., 2014; Le 
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Nguyen et al., 2016). Firms do not prefer lengthy and costly legal support (Limuneau et al., 
2015) but problem-solving and/or the compromising approach, as trust exhibits mutual 
commitment. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3. Trust between the buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) the problem-solving and 
(b) compromising strategies and is inversely related to (c) the legalistic strategy.   
Communication as a relational governance factor reflects inter-firm cooperation and 
integration and refers to suitable, truthful, beneficial and reliable sharing of important 
information (Fischer, 2013; Shahzad et al., 2015). This level of formal and/or informal, 
important and well-timed information-sharing acts as an efficient safeguard in suppressing 
perceived risks, conflicts and uncertainty (Fawcett et al., 2015; Fan and Stevenson, 2018; 
Sharma and Parida, 2018). By strengthening partners’ confidence, effective communication 
drives towards collaborative conflict resolution and effective interaction (Celuch et al., 2011; 
Fischer, 2013). This level of information-sharing supports joint decision making processes and 
safeguards the interest of both partners in order to attain “win-win” goals (Putnam, 1990; Koza 
and Dant, 2007). Thus, effective communication helps managers to better evaluate the nature 
of disagreements and openly express their views across promoting joint problem-solving (Phan 
et al., 2005). However, as the nature of compromising strategy, as a midrange approach, refers 
to accommodating both partners on a “middle-ground”, it is often related to quick decisions 
and an unwillingness to explore the best available alternatives. Thereby, it may not require 
considerable open communication (Lin and Wang, 2002; Song et al., 2006). Furthermore, firms 
prefer not to seek lengthy and expensive legal processes (Wang et al., 2005) if they openly and 
readily share significant information. Therefore, a problem-solving approach becomes central 
when both relationship parties are more interested in sharing critical information and bilateral 
communication in order to end a deadlock. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4. Communication between the buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) the problem-
solving and inversely related to (b) the compromising and (c) legalistic strategies.   
2.4 Conflict resolution strategies and buyer-supplier performance 
Several researchers have argued that conflict resolution can have significant impact on 
relationship performance as well as functional and/or dysfunctional implications (e.g., Le 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Leckie et al., 2017). Therefore, firms are more interested in using 
cooperative and integrative approaches such as problem-solving and compromising in order to 
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seek synergy, collaboration and joint decision-making (Mirkovski et al., 2016). These efforts 
are made to realize the interests and feelings of relationship partners and to satisfy their needs, 
resulting in higher relationship performance (Lu, 2006; Koza and Dant, 2007; Michalski et al., 
2018). Furthermore, both of these approaches encourage partners to adopt constructive 
approaches in a “deadlock” situation and foster a “win-win” solution. Firms quite often adopt 
a “give-and-take” attitude to achieve a compromise in balancing the needs and concerns of both 
parties (Lin and Germain, 1998). However, the legalistic strategy as a conflict resolution 
approach is more assertive in nature than the other collaborative strategies (i.e., problem-
solving and compromising). Therefore, this legal approach might increase the likelihood of 
future conflicts, as it can hurt the partner’s feelings and create inter-partner frustration and 
rigidity. Similarly, some scholars found a negative impact of the legalistic strategy on 
performance and satisfaction, explaining that the likelihood of collaborative efforts in 
eliminating the causes of conflicts is minimized and thereby results in relationship destruction 
(e.g., Le Nguyen et al., 2015). Tensions between relationship partners are aggravated when 
they prefer legal approaches because partners might lose interest and motivation. Thus, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H5. (a) The problem-solving and (b) compromising strategies positively relate to buyer-
supplier relationship performance, while (c) the legalistic strategy is negatively associated with 
buyer-supplier relationship performance.
---------------------------------- Figure 1 Research model approximately here------------------------
3. Methodology and design
3.1 Data and research design
This empirical study contains SMEs involved in buyer-supplier transactions. A list of 892 
SMEs operating with key suppliers (i.e. suppliers providing key components and services) was 
produced from a database developed by a financial services provider (Collector Finland) for 
data collection. However, an attempt to identify transactional and relational governance 
mechanisms relating to the CRS and BSR performance was ineffective for the dataset. 
Therefore, we planned to gather primary data through a web-based survey in order to approach 
vast amount of respondents (Dillman et al., 2009), as well as to attain the requisite level of 
detail about these conflict resolution issues. Our survey was addressed to the potential key 
respondents who were directly involved with buyer-supplier transactions. The respondents’ 
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names and emails were identified from this database. Of the key respondents, 66% operated as 
CEOs, 17% as managers, 16% as managing directors, and 1% as CFOs. Thus, the designed 
questionnaires were sent to these identified potential respondent firms (892 in total) in spring 
2015 by sending follow-up reminders to non-respondents. In total, we received 170 responses, 
obtaining a reasonable response rate of 19.06%. The sample specifies that respondent firms 
have twenty four personnel/firm and €38m/firm turnover, on average; operate in quite a few 
industries (manufacturing: 66.47%, services: 33.53%); and have relationships with suppliers 
that are geographically located in different regions of Asia, Europe and the USA.       
3.2 Construct measurement
Based on existing literature, each construct was operationalized by developing items on a 
seven-point Likert scale exhibiting satisfactory reliability and validity (see Appendix 1). 
Relationship performance was operationalized by four items obtained from prior empirical 
research (Kumar et al., 1992; Artz, 1999). These measures included firm performance 
outcomes, such as satisfaction, success, relationship expectations, and achievement of the set 
objectives. The three CRS (problem-solving, compromising, and legalistic) were taken into 
consideration from Lin and Germain’s (1998) study. The respondents were asked about the 
extent to which a relationship partner resorted to specific actions in resolving conflicts. To 
measure trust, we adapted seven items from Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) research. 
Communication between partners was measured by adapting four items drawn from Heide and 
John (1992) and Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999). Based on Luo (2002, 2009), contract 
completeness was measured using six items. 
We followed an established approach used in recently published research (e.g., Khalid and Ali, 
2017; Shahzad et al., 2018) to measure the level of symmetric interdependence. This approach 
portrays the degree to which both partners are interdependent by investing equal idiosyncratic 
relationship-specific assets with a scale from 1 = very low to 7 = very high. Thus, we split 
interdependence into both buyer and supplier dependence to measure the construct. Buyer 
dependence was determined by two items, adapted from prior research: A- size of the firm’s 
investment in relationship, and B- the extent to which the investment is ‘sunk’, that is, we 
measure the difficulty in redeploying these assets outside the relationship (e.g., Zeng, 1998; 
Reuer and Arino, 2002; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). These two items were collapsed 
into one, determining the dependence of buyer’s firm. Supplier dependence was also measured 
asking similar questions on the supplier’s size of investment and difficulty in redeploying the 
Page 9 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jbim





























































Journal of Business and Industrial M
arketing
investments, and collapsed into one item. By taking the absolute difference between the 
dependence of both buyer and supplier, we have determined the level of symmetric 
interdependence. In this case, a zero (0) describes a perfectly equal symmetric interdependence 
between both parties.  
For example, we have a case where A- a buyer’s investment is 4 out of 7; and the difficulty 
level in redeploying investments is 5 out of 7. We will determine the buyer’s dependence by 
multiplying A by B, that is, 4*5 = 20. Likewise, if a supplier’s dependence calculations are 
also 20, this represents the similar level of interdependence, i.e. 20. The absolute difference 
between these values 20-20 = 0, will determine an equal symmetric interdependence between 
both partners, which helped us to analyze the data. In addition, we included the age of the 
company, length of the relationship (Liu et al., 2009) and the buyer firm’s size (Luo et al., 
2015) as control variables in our model.
3.3 Data checks 
We analyzed the sample by performing a t-test to evaluate the survey’s extent of non-response 
bias as well as to see early and late respondents’ differences (Werner et al., 2007), wherein no 
significant differences were found with regard to firm size or the length of the relationship. To 
avoid common method variance, ex-ante and ex-post steps were taken to limit and evaluate the 
common method bias. In the ex-ante approach, the anonymity and privacy of this research was 
assured for respondents and the questions’ arrangement in the instrument did not determine 
any apparent relationship between constructs. Furthermore, we executed Harman’s single-
factor test as an ex-post step to determine the extent of negative influence by common method 
bias in the data. There was not a single general factor that explained the variability of the data, 
with the main factor accounting for 26.88% of total variance, signaling no issues in the analysis.
3.4 Measure validation
We employed PLS-SEM (SmartPLS 2.0 software) in order to test the research framework and 
hypotheses of the study (Chin, 1998) because it enables the estimation of a series of 
relationships, in which one dependent variable becomes the explanatory variable in subsequent 
relationships. This method demonstrates higher statistical power for complex models and a 
small sample size, and is considered appropriate in testing an explorative model (i.e. 
transactional and relational factors influence CRS and CRS explain relationship performance). 
It also enables simultaneous analysis of both formative and reflective models, and hierarchical 
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models (Becker et al., 2012; Hair et al., 2012). As the sample size of this research is 170, this 
method becomes more applicable in this context. PLS also provides the fit indices in terms of 
descriptive statistics and specifies only the extent of variance of specified relationships 
accounted for in the model. Thus, a large amount of recent business and industrial marketing 
studies have recognized its importance and dynamic attributes and employed PLS-SEM (e.g., 
Michalski et al., 2018; Shahzad et al., 2018; Khalid and Ali, 2017).
Although PLS estimates both measurement and structural models concurrently, this study 
followed the procedure recommended by Hulland (1999), and analyzed and interpreted the 
models in two steps: estimated the assessment and reliability of the measurement model in a 
first phase and tested the structural model in a second phase. The analysis of discriminant and 
convergent validity as well as individual-item reliabilities also support the validation of the 
measurement model (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2012). The loaded values were above the 
benchmark criteria of 0.70 (Gotz et al., 2010) on their particular latent variables, demonstrating 
a higher level of item reliability. Composite reliability scores were also calculated in order to 
assess construct reliability. As reported in Appendix 1, composite reliability for all constructs 
is above than the benchmark criteria of 0.60 (Gotz et al., 2010) for a statistically significant 
construct reliability. Convergent validity was assured with a higher than threshold value of 
AVE (0.50), demonstrating the validity of latent constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981; Gotz 
et al., 2010). The AVE also supports in proving discriminant validity when the square roots of 
a construct’s AVE are greater than the correlations between the latent variables (Chin, 1998; 
Gotz et al., 2010). Further, VIF was also found to be well below the threshold 5 (the highest 
VIF value is 1.75), ensuring no significant multi-collinearity between the constructs (Hair et 
al., 2012). 
----------------------------- Table I AVE and correlations approximately here-----------------------
4. Structural analysis and results
To test our research hypotheses, a path weighting method in PLS analysis was employed, while 
a bootstrapping technique was used in generating t-values (Hair et al., 2012; Chin, 1998). The 
significance levels, path coefficients (standardized β), and R2 (coefficient of determination) of 
dependent variables show the main effects of the structural model. The assessment of explained 
variance R2 for each dependent variable ensured the nomological validity of our research 
model. The R2s for problem-solving, compromising and legalistic strategies are 0.42, 0.39, and 
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0.28, respectively. These results demonstrate that context variables explain 42% of the variance 
in problem-solving, 39% in compromising and 28% in legalistic strategies. Similarly, the R2 
for relationship performance is 0.36, explaining 36% of the variance in the dependent variable 
of relationship performance. 
-------------------------- Table II PLS analysis results approximately here---------------------------
The results indicate that contract completeness is positively related to the problem-solving (β 
= 0.29, p ≤ 0.001) and legalistic (β = 0.44, p ≤ 0.001) strategies and inversely related to 
compromising (β = -0.15, p ≤ 0.01). These results completely support H1. Further, 
interdependence exerts a significant positive effect on the problem-solving (β = 0.13, p ≤ 0.01) 
and compromising (β = 0.19, p ≤ 0.001) strategies, but is negatively related to the legalistic 
strategy. These results partially support H2 (H2a and H2b = supported, H2c = not supported). 
The results for H3a (β = 0.22, p ≤ 0.001), H3b (β = 0.19, p ≤ 0.01) and H3c (β = -0.12, p ≤ 0.01) 
supported the notion that trust between buyer and supplier has a positive effect on the problem-
solving and compromising conflict resolution strategies and a negative effect on the legalistic 
strategy. Moreover, the results of H4 show a significant positive relationship between the 
communication and problem-solving strategies (β = 0.18, p ≤ 0.01) and a negative significant 
relationship between communication and compromising strategies (β = -0.12, p ≤ 0.01), 
supporting H4a and H4b. However, the predicted inverse relationship between communication 
and the legalistic strategy was non-significant, partially supporting H4. Table III also presents 
the results for the impact of CRS on buyer-supplier relationship performance. It indicates the 
significant positive relationship between the problem-solving (β = 0.21, p ≤ 0.001) and 
compromising (β = 0.17, p ≤ 0.01) strategies and relationship performance and a significant 
negative relationship between the legalistic strategy (β = -0.13, p ≤ 0.01) and relationship 
performance. These results thus support H5a, H5b and H5c. Table IV summarizes proposed 
hypotheses and results.
-------------------- Table V Summary of hypotheses and results approximately here-------------
5. Discussion and implications
5.1 Theoretical implications      
This study contributes to business and industrial marketing research and provides new insights 
in different ways. As the current literature lacks explanations of the influence of governance 
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mechanisms on firms’ choices of CRS, this study extends earlier conceptualizations and 
empirically investigates a combined model of transactional and relational governance 
mechanisms. Concerning the first context variable, the findings affirmed and added to the 
theoretical reasoning by an empirical demonstration that contract completeness encourages 
relationship partners to describe and coordinate a mutual agreement. It facilitates a more 
cooperative and integrative problem solving approach in order to satisfy their needs (Malhotra 
and Lumineau, 2011; Lumineau and Henderson, 2012). However, if a problem solving 
approach becomes ineffective, the presence of explicit safeguard clauses of a complete contract 
encourages partners to legally sanction their counterpart in case of contract terms violation 
(Cannon et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2010). Compromising as a conflict resolution strategy becomes 
less prevalent in this s tuation, as partners have the possibility of following contractual 
obligations (Wang et al., 2017; White et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the use of a problem-solving and compromising approach influenced by 
symmetric interdependence demonstrates that due to increased level of relational investments 
(Huikkola et al., 2013), it is very difficult for partners to redeploy these assets. This notion 
creates mutual hostage and prevents partners’ opportunistic behavior in disagreement (Wright 
and Lockett, 2003; Shahzad et al., 2018), thereby facilitating integration and coordination (Le 
Nguyen et al., 2016; Lin and Wang, 2002). These findings also complement the theoretical 
notion that symmetric interdependence produces a socially embedded template where partners 
willingly follow relational norms (Liu et al., 2009; Burkert et al., 2012). However, contrary to 
our expectations, this study found no significant positive relationship between symmetric 
interdependence and the legalistic strategy. A potential explanation for this may be that equal 
relationship-specific investments bind both partners with a huge redeployment cost, thereby 
squeezing the possibilities of seeking more expensive and lengthy legal support. Further, 
several researchers have also argued that the impact of symmetric or asymmetric 
interdependence in varying cooperation perspective is inconsistent, therefore, managers’ 
decisions in this situation should not be permanent (e.g., Michalski et al., 2018).      
Among the relational governance factors, the findings imply that trust is an instrumental factor 
in a conflict situation (Sharma and Parida, 2018), facilitating a cooperative environment and 
behavioral consistency. Similarly, relationship partners feel comfortable with openly 
discussing their problems, expressing their opinions and learning about issues jointly, that 
facilitate a problem-solving attitude (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Yang et al., 2017). Further, 
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relationship partners are encouraged to find fair and agreeable solutions and to look for a 
“middle-ground” to compromise (Zaheer et al., 1998; Ndubisi, 2011). While, in case of a higher 
level of trust, partners behave cooperatively and avoid using a legalistic approach (Kozan et 
al., 2014; Limuneau et al., 2015). Further, effective communication signals confidence and 
commitment between partners while driving them towards more interactions and knowledge 
sharing. This level of information sharing facilitates collaborative and integrative conflict 
resolution (Koza and Dant, 2007; Celuch et al., 2011; Phan et al., 2005). However, 
compromises for conflict resolution may not require considerable communication as quick 
decisions are required and relationship partners may not be eager to explore the best available 
alternatives (Ling and Wang, 2002; Song et al., 2006). Contrary to expectation, we found a 
negative but nonsignificant relationship between communication and the legalistic strategy. A 
potential explanation might be that partners think about a legal approach as open 
communication and information/knowledge-sharing can be a particular burden and will not 
always be effective. It will result in misunderstandings and make partners vulnerable to being 
exploited. For instance, a relational partner might adopt to use proprietary data against its 
counterpart for their own advantage (Fan and Stevenson, 2018). As prior research have also 
argued that overloaded information sharing must be avoided as sometimes it engenders the 
radiation of hard-to-decipher “noise” (Fischer, 2013).          
Further, this study demonstrates that the problem-solving strategy is an effective cooperative 
approach in fostering relationship performance and satisfaction (Lin and Germain, 1998; Lacity 
and Wollcocks, 2017). This means that firms are more interested in cooperative strategies that 
enable partners to mutually adopt particular constructive approaches in a deadlock in order to 
foster a “win-win” solution (Shahzad et al., 2016). These integrative efforts facilitate 
cooperative behavior, concern both parties’ interests and feelings. This helps relationship 
partners to satisfy their needs by creating a positive impact on the relationship performance (Le 
Nguyen et al., 2015). The findings also demonstrate that the legalistic approach may not only 
aggravate future problems but also decrease the firms’ motivation for contributions to and 
involvement in the relationship (Lu, 2006). 
5.2 Managerial implications 
This study has several important implications for managers dealing with conflicts. The research 
framework (specifying a linkage between governance mechanisms, CRS approaches and 
relationship performance) provides an understanding and awareness of possible actions and 
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behaviors of partners in their choices of the most suitable CRS through engaging them in 
effective resolution. Most specifically, the results provide certain suggestions to managers who 
directly face these situations of conflict. We recommend that managers should recognize that 
cooperative and integrative problem-solving approach facilitates open discussion and mutual 
agreement in order to get a “win-win” solution for both parties. For example, managers 
willingly avoid to indulge in dispute as it negatively affects individual and collective 
reputation. A trustworthy environment supports in providing a belief of benevolence and 
reliability in case of compromise on a “middle-ground”, thus, enhancing the commitment to 
continue the long-term relationship. Similarly, interdependency drives partners to compromise 
because of relationship-specific investments they have made, thus, managers are required to 
continuously look for accommodating each other in order to avoid the cost of investment 
redeployment or investment loss. Further, for long-term collaboration and partnership, we 
foresee the legalistic strategy as a last resort where no other possible solution works as well as 
partners cannot mutually come out of a deadlock situation. As this approach is quite lengthy 
and expensive and can hurt the partner’s feelings, the conflicts must resolved through 
alternative approaches.  
5.3 Limitations and future research suggestions 
This research indicates some limitations and future research suggestions. Drawing upon the 
relationship governance literature, the present research examines only four relationship 
governance mechanisms, originating in their influence on CRS. Further studies should 
integrate other important factors with their mediating effects, such as opportunism, relational 
norms, uncertainty, and the reputations of buyers and suppliers. Notable outcomes can be 
originated by using interaction effects (complementary or substitutive) of these mechanisms 
influencing the choice of CRS and their impact on relationship performance. Furthermore, as 
the present study is comprised of only Finnish SMEs operating with key suppliers in Europe, 
Asia and the USA, this approach limits this research and opens up avenues for future research 
in terms of replicating and extending it to the whole Nordic region. As this study adopts a cross-
sectional technique in probing only the buyer’s perspective of conflict resolution, the dyadic 
perspective within a longitudinal research setting or a case study approach would offer 
interesting results in understanding the holistic viewpoint of the link between governance 
mechanisms, CRS and relationship performance. Similarly, by not testing the mediating effect 
of the CRS, this study has limitations in answering the questions of how conflict can be 
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resolved before it manifests into dysfunctional outcomes or how successful each CRS is, given 
the governance mechanisms of inter-organizational relationships. Further research should take 
this into account by utilizing other covariance-based techniques such as SEM via Mplus, 
AMOS or PROCESS, in the hypothesis testing. This might result in an intriguing different 
perspective on theoretical and managerial implications.  
Moreover, the data in this research were collected from single key informant, which opens up 
avenues for future research in terms of obtaining the data from several respondents evaluating 
independent and dependent variables to further minimize common method bias. Additionally, 
in this study, types of conflicts (e.g., constructive and destructive conflicts) are not specified. 
Therefore, future research can include this notion and examine whether the choice of CRS 
depends on conflict types. Finally, we suggest that future researchers should consider some 
additional challenges. It might be interesting to investigate the direct and indirect effects of 
relationship governance factors and CRS on transaction costs and opportunism. The challenges 
of optimal operationalization for the construct of interdependence producing contradicting 
results exist in literature (Caniëls and Gelderman, 2007; Kumar et al., 1995). Therefore, the 
development of more refined measures of interdependence amid several different aspects is 
needed. Beyond concerns of symmetry, interdependence might include the degree of high or 
low mutual dependence, as firms vary in their sizes (Shahzad et al., 2018). Interestingly, further 
research can also categorize the governance factors into four quadrants by using typological 
approach of configuration with one transactional to relational axis and strength of relationship 
as another axis. This relationship between relationship’s strength and governance mechanisms 
will provide another angle to investigate the transition of transactional factors to relational 
factors, strengthening the relationship. Further, as SmartPLS 2 does not provide validity indices 
such as heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT), rho_A and effect size, we strongly recommend 
further research to utilize SmartPLS 3 or above in order to report these additional validity 
indices (Henseler, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2015).           
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Table I AVE and correlations
Constructs AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Contract completeness 0.77 0.88
2. Interdependence 1 0.04 1
3. Trust 0.93 0.12 0.02 0.96
4. Communication 0.83 0.20 0.04 0.47 0.91
5. Problem solving 1 0.32 0.14 0.25 0.20 1
6. Compromising 1 -0.16 0.22 0.23 -0.15 0.13 1
7. Legalistic 1 0.42 -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 -0.21 0.36 1
8. Relationship performance 0.77 0.14 -0.06 0.37 0.51 0.23 0.19 -0.14 0.88
9. No. of employees 1 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.11 -0.05 1
10. Age of the relationship 1 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.28 1
11. Age of buyer firm 1 0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.19 0.04 -0.00 0.08 0.05 0.32 0.52 1
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Table II PLS analysis results
Problem solving Compromising LegalisticConstructs Relationship performance
Contract completeness 0.29 (3.28)*** -0.15 (1.82)** 0.44 (6.50)***
Interdependence 0.13 (1.75)** 0.19 (2.20)*** -0.07 (0.86)
Communication 0.18 (1.93)** -0.12 (1.70)** -0.08 (0.88)





No. of employees -0.02 (0.28)
Age of relationship 0.02 (0.19)
Age of buyer firm 0.03 (0.36)
R2 0.42 0.39 0.28 0.36
*** P ≤ 0.001, ** P ≤ 0.01, * P ≤ 0.05
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Table III Summary of hypotheses and results
Hypotheses Description Results
H1 Contract completeness between buyer and supplier is positively 
related to (a) problem solving and (b) legalistic strategy, and inversely 
related to (c) compromising strategy
Supported
H2 Interdependence between buyer and supplier is positively related to 
(a) problem solving, (b) compromising and (c) legalistic strategy
Partially supported (except the 
relationship between Interdependence 
and legalistic strategy, all else 
supported)
H3 Trust between buyer and supplier is positively related to (a) problem 
solving, (b) compromising and inversely related to (c) legalistic 
strategy
Supported
H4 Communication between buyer and supplier is positively related to 
(a) problem solving and inversely related to (b) compromising and (c) 
legalistic strategy
Partially supported (except the 
relationship between communication and 
legalistic strategy, all else supported)
H5 (a) Problem solving and (b) compromising positively relate to buyer-
supplier relationship performance, while (c) legalistic strategy 
negatively associates with buyer-supplier relationship performance
Supported
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Figure 1 Research model
Page 25 of 26
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jbim





























































Journal of Business and Industrial M
arketing
Appendix 1 Constructs, item loadings, Cronbach's alpha (CA), AVE and composite reliability 
values (CR)
Constructs and items Loadings Item source(s)
Relationship performance (AVE: .77; CA: .90; CR: .93) Artz (1999) and Kumar et al. 
(1992)
The performance of this relationship has? (very difficult 1-7 very easy):
…been very satisfactory 0.8251
…been very successful 0.8886
…fully met our expectations 0.8979
…achieved the set objectives 0.8963
Conflict resolution strategies Lin and Germain (1998)
When there are disagreements/conflicts between buyer and supplier regarding operations and/or 
strategic decisions, your actions are? (never used 1-7 always used):
…use spirit of mutual consensus to fully satisfy both own and supplier’s concern (i.e. problem solving) 1
…use “give and take” to achieve compromise (i.e. compromising)   1
…use legal provisions in the contract to obtain compliance (i.e. legalistic) 1
Trust (AVE: .93; CA: .81; CR .93) Morgan and Hunt (1994)
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly 
agree):
Our key supplier firm: 
…cannot be trusted at times (R) 0.9489
…is perfectly honest and truthful 0.9303
…can be trusted completely 0.9571
…can be counted on to do what is right 0.8956
…is always faithful 0.9303
…is someone I have great confidence in 0.9221
…has high integrity 0.9135
Communication (AVE: .83; CA: .93; CR .95) Heide and John (1992) and 
Young-Ybarra and Wiersema 
(1999)
Regarding communication between you and your key supplier, please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements (strongly disagree 1-7 strongly agree):
…we always keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other party 0.8855
…it is expected that any information, which might help the other party, will be provided to them 0.9228
…it is expected that proprietary information will be shared if it can help the other party 0.9061
…exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally, not only 
according to a pre-specified agreement
0.9322
Contract completeness (AVE: .77; CA: .93; CR .95) Luo (2002) and Luo (2009)
To what extent are the following arrangements with your key supplier firm formalized in the written 
contract (not at all 1-7 entirely)?
…how to operate and manage the relationship 0.8767
…how to cooperate, coordinate, and resolve conflicts between your firm and key supplier 0.9234
…how to terminate the relationship 0.8602
…how to handle the unanticipated contingencies during relationship formation and operation 0.8779
…cost and quality of resources invested in relationship 0.8660
…how to secure invested resources from exploitation 0.8752
Symmetric dependence Zeng (1998), Reuer and Arino 
(2002) and Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999)
Items measuring the dependence of buyer firm (very low 1-7 very high):
…our investment in the relationship is
…if this relationship was to dissolve, our non-recoverable investments would be
Items measuring the dependence of key supplier firm (very low 1-7 very high):
…supplier firm’s investment in the relationship is
…if this relationship was to dissolve, the key supplier firm’s non-recoverable investments would be
Symmetric dependence:
Level of symmetric dependence between buyer and key supplier (i.e., difference between dependence 
of buyer and supplier firm) [0 = 7, 1-8 = 6, 9-16 = 5, 17-24 = 4, 25-32 = 3, 33-40 = 2, 41-48 = 1]
1
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